Wratten speaks: Our Rebuttal
The Daily Mail sought a response to the recent FOI revelations that Former Air Chief Marshall Sir William Wratten sought to “close down” alternative explanations for the crash which killed our loved ones,
The 86-year old former Air Chief Marshal - who wrongly blamed the pilots - has told the newspaper that: "If the Chinook was not airworthy, it would not have been cleared to fly. The Chinook was perfectly servicable and since that accident, no modifications whatsoever were made to it as a result of the accident. Since that time, as far as I'm concerned, it's had a very reliable flight safety record.” You can read the article here, including some of our reaction to his ridiculous statement.
Below is our full and frank rebuttal:
Niven Phoenix, a former RAF pilot for 16 years and now commercial pilot and aviation safety consultant, whose father Ian was killed, said: “Sir William Wratten’s comments are a sickening distortion of the facts we have uncovered, diametrically opposed to the evidence, at odds with the truth and the Ministry of Defence’s own internal documents. He is simply repeating the same institutional lies that we families have spent more than three decades challenging and his comments are deeply insulting. We challenge him to do the honourable thing and finally admit that the aircraft should never have left the ground.
“The Chinook Mk2 was not airworthy on 2 June 1994. As the files we have uncovered thanks to the forensic work of the pre-eminent expert on this case, the late David Hill, show very clearly. The RAF was under ‘mandate’ not to rely on it in any way whatsoever as he can read for himself in official papers, if he can’t recall the facts, on our website - chinookjusticecampaign.co.uk.
“The Release to Service was unlawful, fundamentally compromised because of unresolved FADEC/software integration issues, configuration control failures, and missing certification evidence. Perhaps Sir William should take the time to read ‘The Concealed Evidence’ which is a firm rebuttal to everything in his wildly erroneous statement. It’s surprising he hasn’t done so already but we guess he knows the real truth.
“As for his ridiculous claim that no modifications were made to the Chinook Mk2 following the crash – this is laughable. Why else would the MoD have been suing the contractors, Boeing and Textron Lycoming at the time - although they kept this secret.
“The Chinook Mk2 programme underwent years of continuing technical work, corrective actions, software revisions and airworthiness scrutiny after ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre, around FADEC systems, avionics integration, configuration control, electromagnetic interference hardening, navigation systems and undemanded flight control movements.
“The issue was never whether the Mk 2 helicopters could physically continue flying. The issue was whether unresolved technical and certification concerns existed at the time ZD576 entered service and crashed. They plainly did.
“The full – and lawful – release to service of the aircraft was only approved in September 1998 – four years after the crash - after Boeing and Textron Lycoming were sued by the MoD and modifications made to the software. The suggestion that the aircraft emerged untouched and unquestioned after one of the RAF’s worst peacetime disasters is about as far from the truth as one can possibly get.”
Retired Squadron Leader, Robert Burke, who was unit test pilot at RAF Odiham at the time of the crash, added: “Wratten’s comments bear no resemblance to the reality those of us involved with the Chinook Mk2 programme were dealing with at the time. The RAF itself had imposed weight restrictions on the aircraft because it knew there were ongoing concerns about the reliability of the FADEC engine control system. You do not impose operational weight restrictions on an aircraft if you believe there is absolutely nothing wrong with it.
“Boscombe Down’s own Joint Services test pilots refused to fly the Chinook Mk2 on safety grounds shortly before the crash. I personally had to fly one aircraft back to RAF Odiham because Boscombe’s pilots would not. There were masses of modifications made to the aircraft after the accident because there were so many unresolved issues with the Mk2 introduction to service.
“The suggestion that the aircraft was ‘perfectly serviceable’ and emerged untouched after the crash is a load of absolute nonsense. Even the Public Accounts Committee later described the Mk2 introduction into service as appalling. The full release to service was not properly achieved until years after the disaster.”
Mark Stephens, solicitor for the families, added: “Sir William’s intervention is a curious one. Faced with contemporaneous documents showing the aircraft was neither fully certified nor lawfully released to service, he prefers instead to revisit a conclusion that has been roundly debunked over the intervening years. One might have hoped for reflection; what we have is repetition of a totally untenable position.”
In addition, we reprint all of the issues faced by ZD 576 in the days running up to the crash - we ask you to judge for yourself if this was an aircraft which was “perfectly serviceable” or indeed “airworthy” (two entirely separate matters to those in the know) and of course we also know that the helicopter was unlawfully released to service.
The Helicopter, serial number Zulu Delta 576 was originally delivered to the Royal Air Force as a Chinook HC.1 (standing for Helicopter Cargo Mark 1) on 22 December 1983. The aircraft was then upgraded and re-delivered to No 7 Squadron as a Chinook HC.2 (Helicopter Cargo Mark 2) on 21 April 1994. The most significant part of this upgrade was the installation of a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system. The purpose of FADEC is through the control of the fuel supply to maintain approximately 100 per cent rotor speed in all conditions and to match exactly the engine torque between a helicopter's two engines. The other updates included: upgraded engines and hydraulic system and a new electrical system.
On arrival at RAF Odiham in April 1994, the Helicopter's No. 1 engine had to be replaced due to a FADEC incident. Five days later, that replacement engine had to be replaced for a second time due to a second FADEC incident.
On 10th May 1994, a post-flight fault inspection revealed that a dislocated mounting bracket had caused the collective lever to have restricted movement; this resulted in a "Serious Fault Signal" being sent as a warning to other UK Chinook operating units.
On 17th May 1994, emergency power warning lights flashed multiple times and the No.1 engine was replaced for a third time.
On 25th May 1994, a serious incident occurred which had indicated the imminent failure of the No.2 engine.
On 31st May 1994, two days before the crash, one Chinook HC.1 was withdrawn from RAF Aldergrove and was replaced by ZD576, the Helicopter for the flight on 2nd June 1994.
On 1st June 1994 Boscombe Down grounded the MoD(PE) fleet trials aircraft. The only consideration governing grounding is airworthiness. The primary reason was the unverifiable and unpredictable FADEC software
On 2nd June 1994, a Boeing Chinook helicopter of the Royal Air Force, serial number Zulu Delta 576, call sign F4J40, construction number B-868, crashed in the Mull of Kintyre, Scotland. The crash resulted in the deaths of all twenty-five passengers and the four crew on board.
The families of the Chinook Justice Campaign want to know why our loved ones were allowed to board an aircraft which the MoD’s most experienced test pilots were prohibited from flying.