These are the key documents - that we know about - which show that Chinook ZD576 was not airworthy, should not have been in the air, and had been grounded by the RAF’s testing centre at Boscombe Down. Who sanctioned it to fly on June 2nd 1994 when all 29 on board were killed? What other documents have been sealed away?

  • This official MoD document proves that the military was aware of problems with the Chinook fleet two years before the Mull of Kintyre accident. Download it here

  • Watch the BBC’s 2011 report on the CHART report here

  • The Philips Review which recommended both pilots be cleared of gross negligence states: “The mid-life upgrade of the Chinook was marred by the malfunctions we have described. A lack of understanding of the cause of these malfunctions led shortly before the accident to a decision by Boscombe Down to cease flying the HC-2. In that situation those in command required to balance the risk to service personnel created by ground troop movements against the risk of flying an aircraft with a history of malfunctions which was comparatively unfamiliar to aircrew.”

    https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7cccbaed915d6b29fa8bdb/1348.pdf

  • Internal RAF letter confirming Chinook Mk 2 fleet had been grounded before the accident. Download here

  • This memo describes concerns regarding the safety of the Chinook Mk 2 FADEC engine software and grounding of the fleet. Download here

  • An internal memo after the crash which describes reliance on the FADEC engine software on board the Chinook Mk 2 as ‘positively dangerous’ - download it here

  • Boscombe Down testing centre's Interim CA Release Recommendations - the MoD's 2012 admission was that the Mark 2 Chinook was still INTERIM in June 1994. INTERIM means - not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever - download here

  • Internal memo which recommends that the Chinook fleet be grounded due to “the inadequate standard of the safety critical software used in the FADEC system”. Download here

  • An internal memo describing “the unquantifiable risk associated with the unverified nature of the FADEC engine software” and refusing to recommend release of the Mk 2 helicopter for service. Download it here

  • One month before the crash, a report of a serious fault on ZD 576 and its flying controls.

    Download the document here